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NLRA PREEMPTION OF STATE
LAW ACTIONS FOR WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY
During the past ten years, employees have brought an increas-
ing number of state law actions asserting that they were wrong-
fully discharged from their employment. Both "at-will" 2 em-
1. The increase in the number of cases being brought by employees is due to the
growing number of state courts that recognize the tort of wrongful discharge. Until 1974,
only one court had recognized this action. Petermann v. Local 396, International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). Since 1974, courts in at
least 17 states have recognized the public policy theory of liability. See Scholtes v. Signal
Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65
Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563
P.2d 54 (1977); Palmateer v. International Harvester, 85 II. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Mur-
phy v. Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186
(1981); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Trombetta
v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978); Han-
sen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390
A.2d 149 (1978); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler &
Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289
S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1978).
Courts in at least four more states have recognized the possibility of a suit under pub-
lic policy theory: Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978); Gil v.
Metal Serv. Corp., 412 So. 2d 706 (La. App.), cert. denied, 414 So. 2d 379 (1982);
Keneally v. Orgain, 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980); Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co.,
273 S.C. 766, 259 S.E.2d 812 (1979).
In this Note, the term "wrongful discharge" will encompass "retaliatory discharges"
and "abusive discharges." Retaliatory discharges are discharges that occur in response to
employee action such as the filing of a workers' compensation claim or the reporting of
illegal acts of an employer to governmental authorities. Abusive discharges are those that
are particularly outrageous, such as the firing of a 13-year employee just before his pen-
sion plan is to vest. Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
2. An "at-will" employee is an employee who can be discharged for "a good reason, a
wrong reason, or no reason." Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala.
1977).
H. Wood first articulated the employment-at-will doctrine over one hundred years ago.
H. WOOD, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877):
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden
is upon him to establish it by proof. ... It is competent for either party to show
what the mutual understanding of the parties was in reference to the matter; but
unless their understanding was mutual that the service was to extend for a cer-
tain fixed and definite period, it is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at
the will of either party ....
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ployees and employees covered by collective bargaining
agreements have persuaded state courts that their discharges
were wrongful because they contravened public policy. 3 Employ-
ers have recently begun to defend these wrongful discharge ac-
tions by asserting that the action for which the employee claims
he was discharged is protected by the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA),4 and therefore the state law claim should be
preempted.'
The Supreme Court formulated the preemption doctrine in la-
This doctrine has been restated by commentators and reaffirmed by the courts in re-
cent years. See 9 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1017 (Jaeger ed. 1967); Loucks v. Star City
Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977); Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130
(Ala. 1977); Simmons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 311 So. 2d 28 (La. Ct. App. 1975);
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
The doctrine has also, however, been criticized by numerous commentators as harsh
and unjust to the employee. See, e.g., Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Free-
dom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLuM. L. REV. 1404
(1967); Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law,
40 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Stieber & Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The
Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 319 (1983); Summers, Individual Pro-
tection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); Note, A
Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435
(1975).
3. While the term "public policy" has been described as a "vague and indefinite con-
cept," 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 56.01 (Sands 4th ed. 1972), it will
serve in this Note as a shorthand reference to discharges arising from or relating to an
enforcement of a codified state policy or one implicit in well-established state policies or
judicial decisions. See generally Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124,
421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
5. The federal preemption doctrine has its origin in the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, and was first articulated in cases
challenging state regulation of interstate commerce. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Employers have argued for NLRA "arguably protected or prohibited" preemption in
the following public policy wrongful discharge cases: Aragon v. Federated Dep't Stores,
Inc., 750 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1985); Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740
F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984); Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.
1984); Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985); Viestenz v. Fleming Cos., 681 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 972 (1982); Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981); Sitek v.
Forest City Enters., 587 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Messenger v. Volkswagen of
Am., Inc., 585 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. W. Va. 1984); Thomas v. Kroger Co., 583 F. Supp. 1031
(S.D. W. Va. 1984); Flick v. General Host Corp., 573 F. Supp. 1086 (N.D. Ill. 1983);
Sherman v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 535 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Meyer v. Byron Jack-
son, Inc., 120 Cal. App. 3d 59, 207 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1984); Anco Constr. Co. v. Freeman,
236 Kan. 626, 693 P.2d 1183 (1985); Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 289 Or.
73, 611 P.2d 281 (1980); Smith v. Leon-Ferenbach., 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3360 (Tenn.
Sup. Ct. Rptr. 1983).
An employer also argued for preemption in an action for wrongful discharge in viola-
tion of an implied contract in Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Mich.
1982); see infra note 83.
NLRA Preemption.
bor law because it believed that Congress, in adopting the
NLRA, provided for the comprehensive regulation of industrial
relations.6 To ensure that state laws governing labor relations
not interfere with the NLRA, the Court in San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon,7 established the general principle
that when an activity to which the state law would attach liabil-
ity is "arguably protected" or "arguably prohibited" by the
NLRA, the state law is preempted.' This means, for example,
that the NLRA would preempt a cause of action under a state
labor relations statute by an employee who is discharged be-
cause of union membership.9
It is less clear whether the NLRA preempts an employee's ac-
tion when the employee alleges that the employer violated well-
established public policy in discharging him. This lack of clarity
has led courts in three states to give three different answers to
the question whether the NLRA preempts a wrongful discharge
action by an employee covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment who was allegedly discharged for filing a workers' compen-
sation claim.' 0
Whether the NLRA preempts a state action for wrongful dis-
charge is important to employers and employees for at least
three reasons. First, an employee may be able to receive punitive
damages" as well as reinstatement with back pay when suing for
wrongful discharge in state court. His remedy would be limited
to reinstatement with back pay 2 before an arbitrator or the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB).' Second, the employee
may believe a jury would be more sympathetic to his case than
6. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 239 (1959).
7. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
8. Id. at 245.
9. Viestenz v. Fleming Cos., 681 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972
(1982).
10. The court in Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 22 Cal.
3d 658, 586 P.2d 564, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1978), decided that a state court action was not
preempted by federal law. The court in Thompson v. Monsanto Co., 559 S.W.2d 873
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977), found that the federal law preempted the state action. In a third
case, Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 402, 407 N.E.2d 95 (1980), the court
held that the collective bargaining agreement provided the sole remedy for the unionized
employee and that the employee was barred from bringing a state action.
11. While most courts have stated they would not award punitive damages in wrong-
ful discharge actions, a few have suggested that they might do so in certain cases. See,
e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc.,
255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984).
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
13. The National Labor Relations Board is the agency created by the National Labor
Relations Act to administer its laws. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1982).
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the NLRB. 14 Third, the NLRA has a six-month statute of limi-
tations for bringing unfair labor practice claims. 5 Depending on
the state, the statute of limitations for bringing a tort action for
wrongful discharge may be longer.
This Note considers the circumstances under which the
NLRA should preempt state law tort suits for discharge in con-
travention of public policy by employees covered by a collective
bargaining agreement, and by at-will employees.'" Part I dis-
cusses the rationale behind the preemption doctrine and out-
lines the tests the Supreme Court has adopted for determining
when the NLRA preempts state laws. Part II argues that the
specific rationale behind the Court's preemption tests are inap-
plicable to the typical public policy wrongful discharge action.
Part III identifies the ways in which public policy wrongful dis-
charge actions might infringe on the NLRA. It proposes a pre-
emption test that courts should use to determine when the
NLRA preempts these actions. Finally, Part IV applies this test
to various types of wrongful discharge actions by at-will and
union employees. It concludes that the NLRA does not preempt
certain types of actions for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF NLRA PREEMPTION
The NLRA protects employee activity and prohibits employer
retaliation only if, as a threshold matter, the activity is "con-
14. The employee may believe that layperson jurors would be more likely to sympa-
thize with her individual claim for wrongful discharge than would the Administrative
Law Judges of the National Labor Relations Board who hear hundreds of wrongful dis-
charge cases during their tenure.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
16. This Note will not address the question of whether the remedies for discharge
available to a unionized employee are limited to those provided by the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Although great deference has traditionally been given to the remedies
provided by a collective bargaining agreement, and arbitrators' decisions have been
deemed reviewable only on narrow grounds, in public policy wrongful discharge actions
the state's interest in enforcing its own laws may outweigh the federal interest in limiting
the remedy to the collective bargaining agreement.
This Note will also not address whether state actions for wrongful discharge based on
a breach of contract implied in fact or implied in law, or for breach of an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, should be preempted.
Additionally, this Note will not address the applicability of the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985), regarding preemp-
tion of state-law public policy wrongful discharge actions that are substantially depen-
dent upon analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, to public policy
wrongful discharge actions that are not based on a collective bargaining agreement.
[VOL. 19:2
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certed" and for "mutual aid or protection" within the meaning
of section 7 of the Act. 17 Because section 7 protection is not lim-
ited to unionized workers or organizational activities,"8 and em-
ployees retain their protection under the "mutual aid or protec-
tion" clause when they seek to improve their lot as employees
outside the immediate employee-employer relationship, 9 there
is a potentially large area of overlap between the NLRA and
state public policy wrongful discharge actions. For example, em-
ployees who are discharged because they inform a state agency
of the criminal practices of their employer are arguably engaging
in "concerted activity" designed for "mutual aid and protec-
tion"; they are therefore protected by section 7 of the NLRA.
However, because their discharge also contravenes well-estab-
lished public policy, the employees have grounds for a tort ac-
tion under state law. The issue becomes whether the state tort
action is preempted by the NLRA. The answer to this question
is not readily apparent because Congress, in adopting the
NLRA, implicitly limited the degree to which states could regu-
late labor-management relations, 0 but did not specify the exact
scope of this limitation.1
A. The Garmon and Morton-Machinists Formulas
The Supreme Court developed two formulas to clarify the
scope of this limitation and to help state courts and the NLRB
17. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
18. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
19. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978).
20. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1959); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
21. Uncertainty surrounding the scope of the limitation led Justice Frankfurter to
say almost 30 years ago, "what has been taken from the States and what has been left to
them are of a Delphic nature, to be translated into concreteness by the process of litigat-
ing elucidation." International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
The litigation occurring since his statement has clarified the law somewhat, but has been
far from fully elucidating.
Justice Harlan noted that the litigation had failed to clarify the law when he com-
mented on the "understandable confusion" surrounding the Supreme Court's preemp-
tion decisions. Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 285 (1971). Recently,
Justice Brennan said that although the Court has "developed standards to help it decide
preemption cases, those standards are by necessity general ones which may not provide
as much assistance as we would like in particular cases." Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S.
491, 593 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
One commentator has described the doctrine of preemption as being "as arcane as the
Rule Against Perpetuities." Brody, Labor Preemption Again-After the Searing of Gar-
mon, 13 Sw. U.L. Rev. 201 (1982).
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determine when the NLRA preempts state law. It designed
these formulas for at least three reasons. First, the Court wanted
to prevent state courts from inhibiting federally protected con-
duct.2 2 Second, it wanted to require the Board's expertise in
resolving labor conflicts.25 Finally, the Justices wanted to pre-
vent state courts and the NLRB from producing conflicting an-
swers to labor questions.24
The first formula, based on the the notion that the NLRB has
primary jurisdiction over labor disputes,2 5 is frequently referred
to as the Garmon rule. The Supreme Court in San Diego Build-
ing Trades Council v. Garmon2' decided that the NLRA pre-
cluded a California court from awarding damages under state
law to an employer who suffered economic injuries as a result of
peaceful picketing by labor unions that had not been selected by
a majority of his employees. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for
the Court, announced that state law is usually preempted when
federal and state law might apply to the same labor conduct.
2 7
The Court adopted the rule that "[w]hen an activity is arguably
subject to section 7 or section 8 of the Act, the States as well as
the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the
National Labor Relations Board."2 8 In addition to formulating
the foregoing rule, the Court established two exceptions to it. It
said that the states could regulate activity which was (1) a "pe-
ripheral concern" of the NLRA, or (2) an activity that touched
interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility."' 9
The second formula, also based on the concern that applica-
22. Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286-88 (1971).
23. Id.
24. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
25. Id. at 488-90.
26. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
27. Id. at 243. The Court reached this conclusion by inferring Congress' purpose in
adopting the NLRA. The Court said:
Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially
designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substan-
tive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a vari-
ety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies.... A multiplic-
ity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce
incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive
law.
Id. at 242-43 (citing Garner v. Teamsters Unions, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953)).
28. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245.
29. Id. at 243. The exceptions to Garmon are significant when considering whether
conduct should be presumed preempted or presumed not preempted. Under the Garmon
rule, arguably protected or prohibited conduct is presumed preempted. Under the excep-




tion of a state law would frustrate the purpose of the NLRA, is
often referred to as the Morton-Machinists rule. The Supreme
Court in Teamsters Union v. Mortons° decided that a state sec-
ondary boycott law that prohibited a union engaged in a labor
dispute from asking its employer's customers to boycott the em-
ployer's product should be preempted even though the NLRA
did not cover such activity. The Court held that even when par-
ticular conduct is plainly not prohibited or protected by national
law, a state may not forbid or award damages if application of
the state law would upset the balance of power between labor
and management established by the NLRA. In a later case, In-
ternational Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Commission,1 the Court found that the NLRA
did preempt a state labor relations board decision. The state
board would have enjoined a union and its members from con-
tinuing to refuse to work overtime pursuant to a union policy to
put economic pressure on an employer in collective-bargaining
negotiations. It held that when particular employer or employee
conduct is an economic weapon that has not been specifically
protected or prohibited by Congress, the use of the conduct
should be left to the relative economic strength of the employer
and the union.
B. The Evolution of the Preemption Doctrine Since Garmon
The Supreme Court strictly applied the Garmon rule and its
exceptions for almost two decades following its adoption. Re-
cently, however, the Court has implicitly modified the rule such
that two members of the Court have noted that the "[Garmon]
'rule' of uniformity is a tattered myth. ' 32
The Garmon exceptions for activities that are a "peripheral
concern" of the Act or "deeply rooted in local feeling" were
broadened in Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters &
Joiners, Local 25.8 The Supreme Court held that even though
30. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
31. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
32. Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 329 (1971) (White, J., dis-
senting). Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Stewart disapproved the Garmon
"arguably protected or prohibited" test in International Longshoremen Ass'n Local 1416
v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 201 (1970) (White, J., concurring).
33. 430 U.S. 290 (1977). A suit brought by Farmer on behalf of a deceased claimant
alleged that the union had threatened and intimidated the claimant, thereby causing
him to suffer grievous emotional distress resulting in bodily injury. He also alleged that
the union had discriminated against him in referrals for employment because of his dissi-
WINTER 1986]
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an employee's tort action against his union for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional harm was arguably subject to the NLRA and
"potentially interfered" with the Act, the employee action
should not be preempted. The Court found that a state could
adjudicate cases alleging defamation or violence3 4 when three
factors were present: (1) the underlying conduct that formed the
basis of the state action was not intended to be protected or pro-
hibited by Congress, (2) there was an "overriding state interest"
that was "deeply rooted in local feeling,"35 and (3) there was lit-
tle risk that the state cause of action would interfere with the
effective administration of national labor policy. s
Farmer represents a departure from a strict application of
Garmon. Under Garmon, any potential interference with the
NLRA was sufficient to warrant preemption. Yet, in Farmer, the
Court explicitly stated that the preemption doctrine is not to be
applied inflexibly, especially when the state interest at issue
does not threaten undue interference with the federal scheme.
3 7
The Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters" drew on
the Farmer analysis in continuing its departure from a pristine
reading of Garmon. The Court examined whether picketing on
an employer's premises by non-employees was arguably pro-
tected or prohibited and whether the NLRA should preempt the
employer's state action for trespass. In considering the "argua-
bly prohibited" branch of Garmon, the Court said that the criti-
cal issue was whether the controversy presented to the state
court would be the same one that would be presented to the
NLRB.39 It held that because the issue to be presented to the
dent intra-union political activities.
Farmer is significant when developing a test for preemption of wrongful discharge
cases not only because it is the most recent preemption case in which the state action
was a tort action, but because it was the first of several post-Lockridge cases in which
the Court retreated from its previous strict test for preemption.
34. The Court had previously authorized the states to decide employer-employee
controversies marked by violence and imminent threat to the public order. UAW v. Rus-
sell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
35. This exception was foreshadowed in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonza-
les, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), and UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
36. Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIo ST. L.J.
277, 283 (1980).
37. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 302.
38. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
39. The Court found that the issue that the owner might have presented to the
NLRB was whether the objective of the picketing was prohibited under federal law. The
issue presented to the state court was whether the location of the picketing, without
regard to its objective, violated state trespass laws. The Court held that because this was
different from the issue that could be presented to the NLRB, the state court's exercise
of jurisdiction over trespass aspects of the picketing created no realistic risk of interfer-
[VOL. 19:2
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state court was different from the issue that would be presented
to the Board, the state action should not be preempted. In eval-
uating the "arguably protected" branch, the Court noted that
the initial reasons for the Board's primary jurisdiction were to
ensure that states not prohibit acts protected by the NLRA, and
that the expertise of the Board be used when trying to deter-
mine whether the union activity that the employer wants to en-
join is indeed protected. The Court found that if the aggrieved
party could not invoke the Board's jurisdiction, there would be
little risk of interference with the NLRA. It concluded that the
preemption doctrine would not apply in these cases.40
By suggesting that a state controversy will not be preempted
under the arguably prohibited branch if it is not identical to the
controversy that would be presented to the Board, the Court in
Sears expanded the scope of permissible state actions. After
Sears, the greater the difference between state substantive law
and federal law, the less likely the state action is to be pre-
empted.4 The Court also cut back on the strict application of
Garmon in discussing the arguably protected branch. The Court
suggested that if the union had filed an unfair labor practice
charge against the employer asserting that its picketing was pro-
tected, the state court should determine whether the employer's
trespass action should be preempted by determining the
probability that the union would prevail before the Board.42
This undermines the rationale behind Garmon. One of the pri-
mary goals of the arguably protected branch of Garmon was to
ensure that state courts not misinterpret the NLRA. Yet, the
Court in Sears seemed willing to allow that possibility.
ence with the NLRB. Id. at 197-98.
40. Because the union did not invoke the Board's jurisdiction under the arguably
protected branch, and Sears could not invoke the Board's jurisdiction under this branch,
the Board did not have jurisdiction over the union's arguably protected conduct. Because
the Board did not have jurisdiction, there was no risk of interference with the Board's
primary jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the mere fact that the union's conduct
might be protected was "insufficient" to warrant preemption. Id. at 207.
41. The leading commentator on labor law preemption, Archibald Cox, has argued
that Sears suggests
a conscious or unconscious rewriting of decisional precepts in ways that imply a
significant narrowing of the area of exclusive federal jurisdiction. The more
widely applicable state substantive law differs from the federal law, the greater
will be the differences in the proof required to make a case for judicial relief.
Cox, supra note 36, at 285.
42. Sears, 436 U.S. at 205.
WINTER 1986]
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II. APPLICATION OF Garmon AND Morton-Machinists TO
ACTIONS FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY
The focus of inquiry and holdings of Farmer and Sears indi-
cate that Garmon is no longer the final word in labor preemp-
tion. The Court's failure to apply Garmon strictly without pro-
viding a definitive alternative formulation has created difficulty
for lower courts in determining whether the NLRA preempts
state law.43 This difficulty has been exacerbated by the fact that
there are differences between actions for wrongful discharge
based on state public policy and discharges for typical NLRA-
related activity. Evaluation of lower court efforts to apply the
traditional preemption tests, along with analysis of the differ-
ences between public policy wrongful discharge actions and
traditional preemption cases, indicates that the specific rationale
behind the Garmon and Morton-Machinists tests do not apply
to public policy wrongful discharge actions.
A. Lower Court Efforts to Apply Garmon and Morton-
Machinists to Public Policy Wrongful Discharge Actions
The Ninth Circuit had difficulty applying the traditional pre-
emption tests in Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc. In that
case, Garibaldi, a milk truck driver, refused his employer's direc-
tive to deliver a load of spoiled milk to the company's custom-
ers. Instead, he reported the employer's request to the local
health department. Garibaldi was fired soon after making his re-
port. He filed a claim for damages in state court for wrongful
discharge and intentional infliction of emotional harm. The em-
ployer filed for removal and successfully argued before the dis-
trict court that the case should be removed to federal court.
Garibaldi appealed the district court's decision.
The Ninth Circuit, noting that the case was one of first im-
pression, relied first on New York Telephone Co. v. New York
43. See discussion of Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985), infra note 44 and accompanying text; discus-
sion of Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981), infra note 52 and ac-
companying text; discussion of Sitek v. Forest City Enters., 587 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D.
Mich. 1984), infra note 57 and accompanying text.
44. Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985).
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State Department of Labor,"' a progeny of Machinists, and then
on Farmer," for its holding that the NLRA did not preempt
Garibaldi's claims for wrongful discharge and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional harm.' 7 Because it looked first to a case in the
Morton-Machinists line, the Ninth Circuit did not apply tradi-
tional preemption analysis in Garibaldi. Under traditional anal-
ysis, the court would first have applied Garmon and determined
whether the employee activity was arguably protected or prohib-
ited. Only if it determined that neither section 7 nor section 8 of
the NLRA applied would the court look to a case in the Morton-
Machinists line to determine whether Congress intended to
leave the matter to the free play of economic forces.
In addition to not applying the traditional analysis, the court
only summarily examined whether Garibaldi's state claim would
interfere with the NLRA. The court, after conducting minimal
analysis, concluded that Garibaldi's claim did not pose a signifi-
cant threat to the collective bargaining process because the rem-
edy was in tort, distinct from the collective bargaining
agreement.""
The court also misinterpreted Farmer in considering Gari-
baldi's claim for intentional infliction of emotional harm. The
court correctly determined that Garibaldi's claim, like the
Farmer claim, was grounded in the state's interest in protecting
the health and well-being of its citizens. It erred, however, in
finding that Garibaldi met the Farmer requirement that the in-
fliction of emotional harm be based on the "manner" rather
45. 440 U.S. 519 (1979). In New York Telephone, a three-Justice plurality held that a
New York law that provided unemployment compensation to strikers should not be pre-
empted by the NLRA. The plurality distinguished the case from Morton-Machinists. It
found that unlike the statutes struck down in those cases, the New York statute did not
attempt to regulate or prohibit private conduct. It held that the New York law was one
of general applicability designed to ensure employment security, not to interfere with
labor-management relations. The plurality found that laws of general applicability were
entitled to a presumption of validity unless there was compelling congressional direction
to the contrary.
Five of the other Justices applied the Machinists test to this case. They considered
whether, even though the state's provision of unemployment compensation to strikers
has an impact on the balance of bargaining power between labor and management, Con-
gress had decided to tolerate this degree of interference. The five also disagreed with the
plurality's finding that laws of general application are entitled to a presumption of valid-
ity. They read Machinists to suggest that the presumption should be in favor of preemp-
tion when the state action alters the balance of bargaining power.
That the Justices wrote four opinions in New York Telephone, and no opinion was
joined by more than three of the Justices, suggests that, like Garmon, Morton-Machin-
ists is being read in different ways and/or not being strictly applied.
46. Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1372-74.
47. Id. 726 F.2d at 1375.
48. Id.
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than the "function" of the discharge. The employee in Farmer
was intimidated and threatened by the respondent. In deciding
that the NLRA did not preempt Farmer's suit, the Court em-
phasized that the respondent's conduct was particularly outra-
geous, and that it led to the petitioner's physical and emotional
distress.49 There is nothing in the facts of Garibaldi to indicate
that the petitioner suffered any of the intimidation or threats
that the employee in Farmer had.5 0 Thus, the Ninth Circuit in-
correctly found that Garibaldi's dischargefell within the Farmer
"function-manner" limitation.
5 1
The Tenth Circuit in Peabody Galion v. Dollar2 took a differ-
ent approach in examining whether the NLRA preempted an
employee's claim for wrongful discharge for filing a workers'
compensation claim. The court recognized that this wrongful
discharge claim might not lend itself to the doctrine of preemp-
tion.53 It noted at the very beginning of its analysis that the pre-
emption doctrine might be inapposite because the statute under
which the plaintiff brought action was "in its nature remote"'"
from the NLRA or the collective bargaining agreement. Never-
theless, the court apparently felt compelled to proceed through
the traditional preemption analysis. It applied the Garmon and
Morton-Machinists tests, as well as a third, the "frustration of
purpose" test, to determine whether to preempt the employee's
action.5 5 The court found that under each of these tests the un-
derlying activity that provoked the discharge, filing a workers'
compensation claim, created no risk of conflict with the NLRA
and should not be preempted.
5
1
The district court in Sitek v. Forest City Enterprises5 took
49. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 293-94, 301-02.
50. While it might be said that an employer's discharge of an employee for reporting
the employer's violation of a state safety law was outrageous, this characterization would
be due to the function of the discharge rather than its manner.
51. The court in Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978), properly applied the Farmer "function-manner"
distinction. In Magnuson, an employee was fired when his employer found that he was
responsible for a collision between two freight trains. The employee contended that the
railroad fired him to conceal its own negligence. He sued for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The Ninth Circuit held that the employee did not state a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress because the distress was an incident of the
wrongful discharge, not the manner in which the discharge was performed. The court
said, "the gravamen of the complaint is wrongful discharge." 576 F.2d at 1369.
52. 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981).
53. Id. at 1313.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1314-15.
56. Id. at 1316-19.
57. 587 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
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yet another approach in determining that the NLRA preempted
a supervisor's claim that he was wrongfully discharged because
he refused to discourage his employees from unionizing.5" The
court adopted traditional preemption analysis and relied on
Garmon and Sears. Applying Garmon, the court determined
that the employee's discharge was arguably prohibited by the
NLRA. It then rejected the supervisor's claim that his activity
was a peripheral concern of the Act. The court applied Sears in
concluding that because the plaintiff's claim, that he was dis-
charged in violation of Michigan's public policy after he refused
to discourage his employees from unionizing, was the same claim
that would be presented to the NLRB on an unfair labor prac-
tice charge, the NLRA preempted the employee's claim.5 9
The courts in the foregoing cases construed the various pre-
emption tests in different ways and took different approaches in
considering whether the NLRA preempted certain public policy
wrongful discharge actions. These differing constructions of the
law and differing approaches indicate that the current preemp-
tion tests may be either unclear or inappropriate in determining
whether the NLRA preempts public policy wrongful discharge
actions.6 0
58. Id. at 1382.
59. Id. at 1385.
60. Whether the preemption decisions are unclear or inappropriate would be a moot
point if the Supreme Court's reasoning in Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Con-
tinental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963), or Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1974), applied to public policy wrongful discharge actions. If these cases are
applicable, courts would not need to determine whether the NLRA preempted public
policy wrongful discharge actions.
In Colorado Commission, a black man claimed he was discriminated against in hiring
because of his race. He asserted a claim under a state statute that prohibited discrimina-
tion in employment on the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry. The
employer contended that the state statute should be preempted by either the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1958), or the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-188 (1958).
The Court held that the state law would not be preempted unless it frustrated the
purpose or effectiveness of a federal statute. It found that while the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958 contained general provisions prohibiting unfair treatment to any particular per-
son, no provision specifically prohibited or even mentioned discrimination in hiring. The
Court added that the Railway Labor Act did not address discrimination in hiring even in
general terms. The Court concluded that because neither Congress nor the Civil Aero-
nautics Board had expressly or impliedly intended to bar state legislation governing race
discrimination in hiring in interstate commerce, the state prohibition would not frustrate
the purpose of the federal legislation.
The Court's analysis in Colorado Commission suggests that if neither the purpose nor
the provisions of the NLRA either implicitly or explicitly govern wrongful discharge ac-
tions, the actions should not be preempted. The purpose of the NLRA is
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have oc-
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B. Application of the Rationale Behind Garmon and
Morton-Machinists to Public Policy Wrongful Discharge
Actions
Explication of the rationale behind Garmon and Morton-Ma-
chinists, in conjunction with analysis of the nature and charac-
curred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organiza-
tion, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Section 7 of the NLRA gives employees
the right of self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
Neither the purpose nor the foregoing key provisions of the NLRA expressly refer to
public policy wrongful discharge actions. They do, however, protect an employee's right
to engage in concerted activity and prohibit an employer from discharging an employee
for participating in such activity. The threshold issue in determining whether to preempt
wrongful discharge actions is whether the employee was engaging in concerted activity. If
the employee was acting concertedly, the NLRA will protect the employee's behavior.
This means that unlike the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the Railway Labor Act,
which did not govern discrimination in hiring, it is possible that the NLRA will be appli-
cable to a particular wrongful discharge action.
Farmer makes clear that mere possible applicability and potential frustration of the
federal scheme is not enough to warrant preemption. Parts II and III of this Note also
point out that the concerted aspect of the employee activity may not be the nature and
gravamen of the employee's public policy wrongful discharge action; it may be only inci-
dental to the employee's activity. Despite these observations, a state court must still
determine what the nature and gravamen of the employee activity is, or, in the Court's
terms, whether there is undue interference with the federal scheme. If Colorado Commis-
sion were broadly applied to public policy wrongful discharge actions, courts might not
be compelled to make such a determination because public policy wrongful discharge
actions would be presumed to be independent of the NLRA. This would create the possi-
bility of the state deciding a wrongful discharge case that the NLRA should have
preempted.
For similar reasons, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver is also not applicable to public pol-
icy wrongful discharge actions. In Gardner-Denver, a black employee who had been dis-
charged from employment filed a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement and
asserted that his discharge resulted from racial discrimination. The employee brought
his grievance to arbitration. Prior to the hearing, he also filed a claim with the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission. The arbitrator ruled that the employee was discharged for
cause. The Civil Rights Commission referred his case to the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) which also determined that there was no reason to believe
the employer violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000e (1982).
The employee then filed a claim in district court alleging that his discharge resulted from
a racially discriminatory employment practice in violation of the Act. The district court
held, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the employee was bound by the arbitrator's
decision and had no right to sue under Title VII.
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teristics of public policy wrongful discharge actions, further sup-
ports the contention that traditional preemption tests are inap-
propriate in these cases.
On appeal, the Supreme Court determined that there was nothing in Title VII that
indicated that a prior arbitral decision foreclosed an individual's right to sue in federal
court. It found that the policy against discrimination was of the "highest priority" and
that Congress had provided for overlapping remedies to prevent discrimination. Noting
that the arbitrator has the authority to interpret the collective bargaining agreement but
has no general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the collective bargaining
agreement, the Court held that the contractual right to submit a claim to arbitration is
legally independent of the employee's statutory claim against discrimination, and that
the employee could pursue both.
Wrongfully discharged employees might argue that under Gardner-Denver they should
be able to pursue both their state law actions and NLRA or arbitration remedies. If this
were so, there would be no preemption problem. There are, however, possible supremacy
clause issues with analogizing federal claims for discrimination with state claims for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
Although state public policy actions can usually be characterized as independent of
the NLRA, not all of the actions are indeed independent of the Act. An action for wrong-
ful discharge by a union employee for union activity can be characterized as an action for
wrongful discharge in violation of a state policy prohibiting such discharges. It is clear,
however, that the public policy wrongful discharge action for union activity is not wholly
independent of the purposes and policies of the NLRA because the Act specifically gov-
erns this type of activity.
There would also be supremacy clause problems because the state policies in certain
public policy wrongful discharge actions would not be of the same importance as the
federal policy against discrimination. The Court emphasized in Gardner-Denver that
laws against discrimination were of the highest priority. Although state public policies
generally represent important societal values, not all of them are as important as the
policy against discrimination. If a blanket rule were established that employees could
pursue both state and federal remedies without an evaluation of the importance of the
state policy in question, there would be potential for undue interference with the federal
scheme. This would create a possible violation of the supremacy clause. The Court in
Gardner-Denver did not confront the supremacy clause question. The conflict in that
case was between the federal policy in favor of arbitration and federal laws prohibiting
discrimination. The Ninth Circuit in Garibaldi recognized that the Court did not decide
this possible federal/state conflict and implied that there might be a supremacy clause
issue if all employees were allowed to pursue both forums. 726 F.2d at 1375 n.13. A
commentator has also recognized this potential conflict. Comment, NLRA Preemption of
State Wrongful Discharge Claims, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 658 n.134 (1983).
The Supreme Court of Oregon applied the reasoning of Gardner-Denver to a public
policy wrongful discharge action. Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 289 Or. 73,
611 P.2d 281 (1980). In that case, an employer refused to reinstate a union employee
following her recovery from compensable job-related injury. She sued under state stat-
utes that prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, sex, national ori-
gin, marital status, application for workers' compensation benefits, and physical or
mental handicap that does not prevent performance of the work involved. In analogizing
the employee's claim to that made in Gardner-Denver, the court rejected the employer's
contention that the compelling policy considerations behind Title VII to prohibit racial
or other antiminority discrimination were not present in this case. The court found that
the state statutory scheme providing a personal action for an employee claiming discrim-
ination was sufficient to override the policy favoring exclusivity of collective bargaining
remedies. It held that the employee was not required to exhaust her remedies under the
collective bargaining agreement before filing suit for injunctive relief in state court.
Vaughn does not necessarily undercut the argument made earlier that there would be
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1. Application of the specific rationale behind Garmon to
public policy wrongful discharge actions- The general ration-
ale behind Garmon-to prevent the states from interfering with
the NLRA-is applicable to wrongful discharge actions. The
specific rationale, that a state might prohibit activity that the
NLRA protects61 or issue a remedy that conflicts with that pro-
vided by the NLRA,62 are, however, absent in the typical wrong-
ful discharge action.
In the prototypical employee state action for wrongful dis-
charge in violation of public policy, the employee contends that
the employer violated a codified law or long-established state
policy by discharging him. 3 The employer may then assert that
the employee activity that led to the discharge is protected
under section 7 of the NLRA. He would argue that Garmon dic-
tates that the NLRA preempt the state action. In this scenario,
the employee is not asserting that the activity that led to his
discharge is protected by the NLRA. Therefore, there is virtu-
ally no risk that the state will fail to protect activity which is in
fact protected by the NLRA. For example, the employee in
Petermann v. Local 396, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters" asserted that he was discharged for refusing his em-
ployer's request to commit perjury. Petermann sued in state
court under public policy wrongful discharge theory. He did not
contend that he was discharged in violation of his section 7
rights. Because he was not asking the state court to protect his
section 7 rights, there was no risk that the state would fail to
protect them. This example indicates that the primary motiva-
supremacy clause problems with allowing all employees bringing public policy wrongful
discharge actions to pursue both arbitration and the state remedy. In Vaughn, the state
statutes were important ones similar in content and character to those of Title VII. Fur-
thermore, the rights protected under Title VII are separate from those protected by the
NLRA. It will not always be true, however, that the state statute or policy under which
the employee will sue will be analogous to Title VII, i.e., important enough to override
the federal policy favoring exclusivity of collective bargaining remedies, or to protect
interests separate from those guarded by the NLRA. Thus, if the employee were allowed
to pursue both remedies, there would be potential conflict with the federal scheme if
courts were not compelled to determine whether the state law protects interests indepen-
dent of the NLRA or comparable in importance to Title VII.
61. See Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181, 193
(1965); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 203 (1978).
62. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
63. See, e.g., Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper, Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir.
1984); Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985); Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981); Flick v.
General Host Corp., 573 F. Supp. 1086 (1983).
64. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
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tion behind Garmon, the fear that state courts will fail to pro-
tect employee activity that is in fact protected, is not applicable
to the public policy wrongful discharge case.
The concern that the state remedy would be different from
that provided by the NLRA is also not pertinent to the public
policy wrongful discharge case. The remedy provided by the
NLRA-reinstatement with back pay-is the same remedy that
state courts order or allow juries to consider ordering. 5 This
means that the employee in Thomas v. Kroger Co.,66 who was
discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim, could ex-
pect the same remedy from the state court and the NLRB. e7
2. Application of the rationale behind Morton-Machinists to
public policy wrongful discharge actions- The rationale behind
Morton-Machinists was that Congress left certain economic
weapons unregulated and to the free play of economic forces.
This rationale is also inapplicable to public policy wrongful dis-
charge actions. In the typical public policy wrongful discharge
action, the employee conduct that leads to the discharge does
not involve an employee's or union's use of an economic weapon
against an employer. This is due in part to the fact that public
policy wrongful discharge actions are generally brought by a sin-
gle employee based on an alleged violation of public policy. The
actions of a single employee in this area usually will not affect
the balance of power between labor and management. In per-
haps the only public policy wrongful discharge case involving
more than one employee, a court rejected the argument that
Morton-Machinists applied. The court in Peabody Galion held
that although Congress had not indicated its intention to regu-
late workers' compensation discharges, it was unlikely that al-
65. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Brown v.
Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289
S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1978).
66. 583 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. W. Va. 1984).
67. In United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Russell, 356
U.S. 634 (1958), the Supreme Court held that the primary jurisdiction of the NLRA did
not prevent an employee, who was denied access to his employer's plant by a striking
union, from bringing a tort action for compensatory damages for loss of earnings and
mental anguish plus punitive damages. The Court reasoned that if the employee's com-
mon law rights against a union tortfeasor were cut off, the union would be granted sub-
stantial immunity from the consequences of mass picketing or coercion. It concluded
that "an employee's right to recover, in the state courts, all damages caused him by this
kind of tortious conduct cannot fairly be said to be pre-empted without a clearer declara-
tion of congressional policy than we find here" and that "[t]he power to impose punitive
sanctions is within the jurisdiction of the state courts but not within that of the Board."
356 U.S. at 646. See also United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S.
656 (1954).
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lowing the states to regulate such discharges would affect the
balance of power between labor and management.6 8 This analy-
sis indicates that Morton-Machinists will generally not apply to
public policy wrongful discharge actions."s
III. A PREEMPTION TEST FOR ACTIONS FOR WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
Although the foregoing analysis indicates that the specific ra-
tionale behind Garmon and Morton-Machinists are not applica-
ble to the public policy wrongful discharge actions, the general
rationale behind these cases-to prevent states from interfering
with the NLRA-is applicable. For example, an action for
wrongful discharge for union activity could be characterized as
an action for wrongful discharge in violation of a state policy
against discrimination on the basis of union activity.70 It is clear,
however, that this wrongful discharge action is not wholly inde-
pendent of the NLRA. The purposes and policies of the Act spe-
cifically govern discharges for union activity. Thus, a state deci-
sion would likely infringe on the NLRA if the NLRA were not
held to preempt wrongful discharge actions for union activity.
Therefore, courts, when confronted with a wrongful discharge
action in which the discharge may be prohibited by the NLRA,
must still determine whether the state action would "frustrate
effective implementation of the Act's processes.""
In deciding whether the NLRA preempts an employee's state
action, courts should apply a preemption test that gives them
the flexibility, freedom, and guidance to decide whether a partic-
68. 666 F.2d at 1316.
69. The Associate General Counsel of the NLRB for the Division of Advice has
stated that he believes that Morton-Machinists will generally not be applicable to
wrongful discharge actions of at-will employees. See H. Datz, Wrongful Discharge Cases
and the Doctrine of Preemption Under the NLRA, Remarks at the Meeting of the Amer-
ican Bar Association Labor Law Section 5, 6 (Aug. 1984) (available from the Office of the
Associate General Counsel for the Division of Advice of the National Labor Relations
Board).
70. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
71. This is the critical question in determining whether the state action should be
preempted. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1966). Five Justices in New York Tel. Co. v.
New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979), recently reaffirmed that this is the
ultimate issue. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, quoted Machinists, 427
U.S. at 150 (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394
U.S. 369, 380 (1969)), in saying that state action should be preempted when it would
"frustrate effective implementation of the Act's processes." 440 U.S. at 549. Justice Pow-
ell, joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, cited the same
passage from Railroad Trainmen, 394 U.S. at 558.
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ular state action would indeed infringe on the NLRA. This test
should encourage courts to examine the nature of the employee
action, the state and NLRA interests in question, the relation-
ship between the state law and the NLRA, and the overall po-
tential for infringement of state law on the NLRA.
A. The Threshold Question- "Arguably Protected or
Prohibited?"
A court's first step in deciding whether the NLRA preempts
the state action is determining whether the employee activity is
arguably protected, and the discharge, therefore, arguably pro-
hibited. If the action is not arguably protected, there will be no
preemption problem. 72 To determine whether the activity is pro-
tected, the court must decide whether the employee activity was
"concerted" and "for purposes of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection," as required by section 7 of the
NLRA.
1. Employees covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment- The Supreme Court's recent 5-4 decision in NLRB v.
City Disposal Systems, Inc.73 endorsed the NLRB v. Interboro
Contractors, Inc.71 broad definition of concerted activity as it
applies to employees covered by a collective bargaining contract.
The Court in City Disposal determined that the action of an
individual employee, who was discharged when he refused to
drive a truck that he honestly and reasonably believed was un-
safe due to faulty brakes, constituted concerted activity. The
Court explained that because a single employee's invocation of
rights derived from a collective bargaining agreement affects all
employees covered by the agreement, a single employee's actions
can constitute concerted activity.76 The Court specifically held
that the phrase, "to engage in concerted activities," does not re-
quire that two or more employees work together towards the
same goal.76 This broad definition of concerted activity means
that, in most cases, the conduct of an employee covered by a
72. This is because there is no need to determine whether Morton-Machinists might
apply. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
Courts will generally not need to determine whether the employee conduct was argua-
bly prohibited because employers will rarely if ever assert that the activity that led to
the employee's discharge was prohibited by the NLRA.
73. 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984).
74. 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
75. City Disposal, 104 S. Ct. at 1511.
76. Id. at 1513.
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collective bargaining agreement that leads to an allegedly wrong-
ful discharge will be arguably protected as concerted, and the
discharge arguably prohibited.
2. At-will employees- The potential overlap between activi-
ties of at-will employees protected by state law and activities ar-
guably protected as concerted activity under the NLRA was nar-
rowed by the Board's recent decision in Meyers Industries.7
The Board in Meyers considered the claim of a truck driver who
asserted that he was discharged for refusing to drive a truck that
he believed was unsafe and for informing the state inspection
commission that the vehicle violated certain state safety provi-
sions. The Board ruled that the truck driver's refusal to drive
the truck and his report of the violation to the local authorities
did not constitute concerted activity under its new definition of
the term. The Board said that to receive section 7 protection, an
employee must be "engaged in with or on the authority of other
employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee him-
self."'7 8 This narrowing of the definition of concerted activity for
at-will employees will make it considerably more difficult for
employers to persuade courts that the activities that led to the
employee's discharge were protected as concerted under section
7.
77. 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), remanded sub nom., Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 313 (1985). The Board's decision in Meyers Industries
overruled its holding in Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975). The Board in
Meyers said that it was returning to the "pre-Alleluia Cushion" definition of concerted
activity.
Alleluia Cushion had held that a solitary employee's protest of an alleged Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act violation was concerted activity. The Board reasoned that
the existence of federal and state occupational health and safety laws suggested a wide-
spread employee concern with such matters such that "the consent and concert of action
emanated from the mere assertion of such statutory rights." 221 N.L.R.B. at 1000. Nu-
merous progeny of Alleluia Cushion applied this reasoning to find concerted activity in
single-employee discharge situations frequently actionable under state law wrongful dis-
charge theory.
The D.C. Circuit refused to enforce the Board's Meyers decision and remanded it for
reconsideration. The court determined that the decision was not a return to the pre-
Alleluia Cushion standard the Board and the courts applied, but was "substantially
more restrictive" than the standards the courts and the Board had previously applied.
755 F.2d at 956.
This Note assumes that Meyers is still the law of the NLRB. If the Board decides to
broaden the Meyers definition of concerted activity, it is probable that more employers
will defend wrongful discharge actions brought by at-will employees by arguing that the
NLRA preempts the state action because the employee activity that led to the discharge
was protected, and the discharge therefore prohibited.
78. 268 N.L.R.B. at 497. The Board's decision emphasized that the question under
this standard is "a factual one, the fate of a particular case rising or falling on the record
evidence." Id.
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B. The Proposed Preemption Test
If the court determines that the employee activity is arguably
protected and the discharge arguably prohibited, the court
should start with the presumption that the NLRA preempts the
state action. If, however, it falls within the following exceptions
to this rule, the court should presume that the NLRA does not
preempt the state action.79 In both cases, the court should then
weigh the nature of the federal and state interests in question
and determine whether application of the state law would in-
fringe on national labor policy.80
Even when the court presumes that the NLRA protects the
79. See supra note 29. The exceptions are designed to assist a court in determining
whether application of the state law would frustrate the purposes and policies of the
NLRA in a given case.
80. The Court in Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 25,
430 U.S. 290, 300 (1977), advocated this balancing of state and federal interests. This
Note will not, however, conduct this balancing test in most of the factual situations dis-
cussed in Part IV. The Note will generally assume that once a court determines the
appropriate presumption, it will find in favor of that presumption.
The equities militate against allowing an employer to use preemption as a defense to
public policy wrongful discharge actions. Traditionally, employees and unions have ar-
gued for preemption when an employer has brought a state action against them. For
example, in Garmon the unions argued that their peaceful picketing was protected by
the NLRA. They contended that the state court did not have jurisdiction to award dam-
ages arising out of peaceful union activity that it could not enjoin. In addition to not
wanting the state court to issue a remedy that the Board could not have issued, they may
have believed the state court did not have the expertise to deal with labor controversies
and/or had sympathies unfavorable to those of the labor movement. As suggested supra
text accompanying notes 22-24, these employee and union fears were some of the reasons
for the Garmon rule.
In the case of an employee suing for wrongful discharge, the employer is using preemp-
tion as a defense. The employer argues that the employee/union conduct that led to the
discharge was protected under section 7 of the NLRA. This creates the "absurd specta-
cle," Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 469, 474 (1972), of an employer arguing that even though his discharge of
an employee might violate state public policy theory, because it might also be an unfair
labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act, it should be preempted. For ex-
ample, the employer in Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 161 Cal. App. 3d 402, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 663 (1984), argued that even though he might have violated state public policy by
discharging an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim, because he might have
also violated the NLRA by discharging an employee engaged in concerted activity, the
employee's state action should be preempted. In effect, the employer is asking the court
to conclude that his two alleged wrongs, violation of the state law and violation of the
NLRA, give him the right to have the employee's action preempted.
For reasons similar to this, commentators have recommended that Garmon's arguably
protected-arguably prohibited inquiry be abandoned. They would argue for an approach
that focuses directly on balancing the state interest in regulating the challenged conduct
with the federal interest in prohibiting the state regulation. See, e.g., Cox, Labor Law
Preemption Revisited, 85 HAsv. L. REv. 1337, 1351-68 (1972); Recent Development, 64
CoRNE.LL L. REv. 595, 609-12 (1979).
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employee activity, the court should not preempt the state action
if it falls within one of the following three exceptions. The first
two exceptions were identified as exceptions to the Garmon rule.
The determinations to be made are: (1) whether the activity in
question lies at the core rather than the periphery of the NLRA,
and (2) whether the state guards governmental interests sepa-
rate from or at the periphery of the NLRA. s' Generally, states
have a strong regulatory interest in laws relating to crime,
health, and safety. The final exception is a two-part test. The
court should examine whether the employee's wrongful dis-
charge action is based on a state law that guards governmental
interests separate from the NLRA, and whether the nature and
gravamen of the employee activity is grounded in this law. 2 If
the court determines that the true nature of the employee's
complaint is an unfair labor practice or a grievance for violation
of a collective bargaining agreement, or that the wrongful dis-
charge is based on a state law that occupies an area covered by
the NLRA, then the court should decide that the NLRA
preempts the wrongful discharge action. If, however, the state
law protects interests other than those guarded by the NLRA,
and the employee activity that led to the discharge is rooted in
this law, the state action should not be preempted. There would
be little risk of infringement on the NLRA in this case."3
81. See supra note 36.
82. In determining whether the nature and gravamen of the employee activity was
rooted in the state claim, a court would be determining whether the complaint was "well-
pleaded." According to the well-pleaded complaint doctrine, a plaintiff may not avoid
federal jurisdiction simply by omitting from the complaint or by casting in state law
terms a claim that can only be made under the federal law. In a wrongful discharge
action, a court will be investigating whether the employee has merely recharacterized a
grievance or unfair labor practice as a wrongful discharge action to avoid preemption.
See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3722 (1976).
The Court in Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), noted that it
is the nature of the conduct rather than its characterization that is critical in preemp-
tion. The Court said: "[pireemption ... is designed to shield the system from conflicting
regulation of conduct. It is the conduct being regulated, not the formal description of
governing legal standards, that is the proper focus of concern." Id. at 292. See also Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967).
A district court in Texas held that "the issue of whether an 'unfair labor practice' is
the real nature of plaintiff's complaint is a matter to be resolved in the state tribunal."
Galveston v. International Org. of Masters, 338 F. Supp. 907, 909 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
83. The court in Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Mich. 1982),
applied much of the proposed preemption test to the action of an employee who claimed
she was wrongfully discharged in violation of an implied contract. In that case, the em-
ployee claimed that she had been told that she would have her job as long as she per-
formed her duties satisfactorily. In her deposition, however, she testified that she
thought she was fired because of her union activity. The court looked to the true nature
of the conduct that led to the discharge, rather than the legal theory she used to frame
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The foregoing exceptions incorporate the traditional excep-
tions, as well as reflect the belief that although the NLRA occu-
pies the field of employer-employee relations with respect to the
field of collective bargaining, it does not encompass the entire
field of employee protection. 4 The third exception recognizes
that state courts are free to supplement federal protection if the
state law does not infringe on the policies or purpose of the fed-
eral law.s5 As long as the state law protects interests separate
from those protected by the NLRA, and the employee activity is
based on this state law, there will be little risk of infringement
with the NLRA."6
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PREEMPTION TEST TO STATE LAW
ACTIONS FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY
Actions for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
may be divided into three categories based on the interest the
her claim. It found that even though she couched her claim in terms of breach of an
employment contract, the true basis of the claim was the NLRA. The Court followed
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1979) in holding that because the
controversy presented to the state court would be identical to the one that could have
been presented to the NLRB, the claim should be preempted.
84. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). This
statute governs discrimination in employment.
85. This was the Supreme Court's view in UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. at 634, 644
(1958); see supra note 56 and accompanying text. Furthermore, parallel purposes be-
tween statutes do not necessarily mean that the state statute will be preempted; see
discussion of Colorado Commission, supra note 60.
86. Judge Richard Posner viewed the nature and gravamen of the employee's action
for wrongful discharge as a key factor in his dissent in Jackson v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 717 F.2d 1045, 1057-61 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984). In that
case, an injured railway employee brought action against the railroad under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982). He was discharged soon after filing
his injury claim. The court held that because the complaint was identical to the claim he
would have made had he pursued the grievance through administrative channels, the
potential interference with the federal regulatory scheme was too great to permit an ex-
ception to the preemption doctrine. The court held that the employee's state tort remedy
was preempted by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
Judge Posner found that Jackson's claim was an action separate from the collective
bargaining agreement. He said, "The collective bargaining agreement in this case is no
more the source of Jackson's cause of action than if he were suing Conrail for a battery
committed against him by his supervisor." 717 F.2d at 1061. He hypothesized that the
Railway Labor Act and the arbitration provision would not prohibit the employee from
bringing a battery action against his supervisor if the supervisor punched him in the
nose. He concluded by saying that even though the employer might be violating the col-
lective bargaining agreement by discharging the employee, it would be surprising if arbi-
tration under the agreement was intended to eliminate the employee's common law
rights.
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employee asserts and the factual situation giving rise to the
claim. The first category involves discharges in violation of state
policies relating to wages, hours, or working conditions. The ac-
tion for which the employee was discharged might, for example,
relate to union activity or complaints about working conditions.
The second category covers discharges in retaliation for asser-
tion of state institutional interests.8 7 Institutional interests are
those relating to enforcement of a statutory right or violation of
a state law. These can include, for example, discharges in retali-
ation for filing a workers' compensation claim88 or discharges for
refusing to obey the employer's request to commit perjury.89
Discharges in retaliation for "whistleblowing" 90 constitute the fi-
nal category. The employee's whistleblowing activity might be a
nurse's preparation of a report critical of her employer's hospital
procedures,"1 or a truck driver's informing a state agency that
the truck he was driving had poor brakes.92
A. Discharges in Violation of State Policies Relating to
Wages, Hours, or Working Conditions
Because the NLRA protects concerted employee activity relat-
ing to wages, hours, or working conditions, the NLRA will al-
most always preempt state laws that protect employee interests
in these areas.
1. Employees covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment- Unionized employees sometimes assert that they were
discharged in violation of a state public policy for activity relat-
ing to wages, hours, or working conditions.93 For example, in Vi-
87. The term "institutional" was given this meaning by a commentator. Comment,
supra note 60, at 661-62.
88. See, e.g., Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981); Thomas v.
Kroger Co., 583 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. W. Va. 1984); Wyatt v. Jewel Cos., 108 Ill. App. 3d
840, 439 N.E.2d 1053 (1982); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297
N.E.2d 425 (1973); Murphy v. Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan.
App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981).
89. Petermann v. Local 346, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
344 P.2d 25 (1959).
90. "Whistleblowing" may be defined as "the disclosure by an employee of his em-
ployer's improper activities." Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory Dis-
charge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 277 (1983).
91. Misericordia Hosp. Medical Center, 246 N.L.R.B. 351 (1979), enforced, Misericor-
dia Hosp. Medical Center v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1980).
92. Meyers Indus., 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755
F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, Meyers Indust., Inc. v. Prill, 106 S. Ct. 313
(1985).
93. Cases that fall into this category include: Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
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estenz v. Fleming Cos.,9 4 the employee alleged that he was dis-
charged because of his union activities, rather than for stealing
as the employer claimed. He argued that discrimination on the
basis of union activity violated state policy. Under City Dis-
posal, regardless of the particular union activity in question, Vi-
estenz's activity was arguably protected because he was a union
employee engaging in NLRA protected activity. The question
then is whether the state action would infringe on the NLRA.
Viestenz's wrongful discharge action would be preempted
under the proposed preemption test. The activity does not lie at
the periphery of the NLRA because union activity is exactly the
type of activity that the NLRA prototypically protects. More-
over, the state law or public policy under which Viestenz
brought suit is the same type of activity that the NLRA was
specifically designed to protect. Therefore, because Viestenz's
activity was arguably protected and does not fall within one of
the exceptions, his claim should be preempted.
2. At-will employees- The Board's decision in Meyers will
make it more difficult for employers to prove that the activity of
an individual employee, even if it relates to wages, hours, or
working conditions, constitutes concerted activity. For example,
a nurse's aide in Autumn Manor v. Broz95 was discharged after
questioning her employer about the dismissal of two fellow em-
ployees. If the nurse's aide had questioned the employer in pri-
vate and did so solely for her own benefit and not on behalf of
the other employees, the employee activity would not be con-
certed under Meyers. If, however, as actually happened, the
nurse's aide questioned her employer in front of other employees
and with their encouragement, then the employee activity would
meet the Meyers test. The next question, if the employer were
arguing for preemption, would be whether the activity fell
within one of the exceptions to the preemption test. The nurse's
aide's concern with job security relates to interests that lie at the
core rather than the periphery of the NLRA. Also, the nature of
her activity is grounded in the NLRA and any state policy under
which she might bring action would overlap with an area tradi-
tionally occupied by the NLRA. Therefore, the nurse's aide's ac-
tion, and most, if not all, at-will employee actions arising from
736 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984); Viestenz v. Fleming Cos., 681 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982); Sitek v. Forest City Enters., 587 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Mich.
1984); Sherman v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 535 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Smith v. Leon-
Ferenbach, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3361 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1983).
94. 681 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982).
95. 268 N.L.R.B. 239 (1983).
WINTER 19861
Journal of Law Reform
concerted activity relating to wages, hours, or conditions of em-
ployment, should be preempted.9
B. Discharge in Violation of State Institutional Interests
Unlike actions for wrongful discharge arising under state laws
or policies relating to wages, hours, or working conditions, ac-
tions for wrongful discharge in violation of state institutional in-
terests should generally not be preempted.
1. Action for discharge in retaliation for refusing to violate
state laws- Both at-will and union employees have claimed to
have been discharged for refusal to obey their employer's re-
quest to violate the law. For example, employees have been dis-
charged for refusing to alter pollution control reports,97 drive an
ambulance that lacked medical equipment required by the
state,98 drive a truck with poor brakes,9 or perform a medical
procedure on a hospital patient that the employee was not quali-
fied to perform. 100
In each of the above cases, the employer might have argued
that the employee refusal constituted concerted activity, was
protected, and should be preempted. In Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield,'0' the employee was discharged for refusing to fix gas-
oline prices. The employer might have argued that the em-
ployee's refusal constituted concerted activity under the NLRA.
It is unlikely, however, that the employer's argument would have
been persuasive, even if the employee was part of a union and
the City Disposal standard were applied. Employees generally
do not have a section 7 right to protest employer actions that are
unlawful under local laws if these laws have nothing to do with
safeguarding wages, hours, or working conditions. 02 This is be-
96. See H. Datz, supra note 69, at 4.
97. Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385
(1978).
98. NLRB v. Parr Lance Ambulance Serv., 723 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1983).
99. Meyers Industries, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, Meyers Indus., Inc. v. Prill, 106 S. Ct.
313 (1985).
100. O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978).
101. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
102. H. Datz, supra note 69, at 7; see NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S.
9, 17 (1961). The Court in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567-68 (1978) stated:
It is true, of course, that some concerted activity bears a less immediate relation-
ship to employees' interests as employees than other such activity. We may as-
sume that at some point the relationship becomes so attenuated that an activity
cannot fairly be deemed to come within the "mutual aid or protection clause."
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cause the NLRA only protects employee activity relating to em-
ployee interests in wages, hours, or conditions of employment.
Refusing to fix gasoline prices does not relate to these employee
interests. Therefore, because the employee activity is not pro-
tected under the NLRA, the employer would not meet the
threshold test and the state action should not be preempted.
Even if the employer could show the activity were concerted,
the employee's action should not be preempted if he were dis-
charged for refusing to violate a state criminal, health, or safety
law. In Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Railroad Co.,105
the employee refused to violate environmental pollution laws. In
this case, the employee action would not be preempted because
laws relating to health and safety have long been viewed as fall-
ing within "the deeply rooted in local feeling" exception.'
The potentially difficult case occurs when the employee was
discharged for refusing to violate a law that does not relate to
crime, health, or safety. The relevant question then is whether
the employee's activity was based on that law or whether it was
based on the NLRA, the state law claim being a ruse designed to
prevent the NLRA from preempting the potentially more suc-
cessful state law claim.10 5 For example, if the employee in
Tameny had refused to fix gas prices to protect the public inter-
est, i.e., to ensure that gasoline prices not be increased beyond
what the market would dictate, his activity would not be pro-
tected under section 7. There would be no risk of preemption. If,
however, his objective were to spark other employees to partici-
pate in union activity, he would be engaging in prototypical
NLRA protected activity, regardless of his characterization of
his action as purely a "state law" claim. His activity would then
fall under the first category of employee activities-employee
claims arising from activity relating to wages, hours, or working
conditions-and his claim would be preempted.
103. 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978).
104. In Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315
U.S. 740 (1942), the Supreme Court decided that the NLRA did not prevent the Wiscon-
sin Employment Relations Board from ordering the members of a striking union to cease
picketing employee homes and threatening employees who wanted to work, despite the
strike under the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, 1939 Wis. Laws ch. 57. The Court
held that the NLRA did not preclude a state from enacting legislation in exercise of "its
historic powers over such traditionally local matters as public safety and order and the
use of streets and highways." Id. at 749.
105. In some cases, it might be argued that the employee's refusal to break the law
was concerted. For example, the employee might have refused the employer's request
because he thought that if he were caught, it would make it more difficult to find future
employment. This, however, is at best tenuously related to employee interests or condi-
tions of employment and would probably not constitute concerted activity.
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2. Workers' compensation claims- Both at-will1 06 and un-
ionized employees' 07 have been fired allegedly in retaliation for
filing workers' compensation claims. Filing a workers' compensa-
tion claim usually has little or nothing to do with union organi-
zation or collective bargaining. 0 8 This was the case in Flick v.
General Host Corp.109 In Flick, an at-will employee filed a claim
for workers' compensation after he was injured lifting a heavy
bag during the course of his employment. There was nothing in
the employee's filing of the claim to make it seem like part of
organized activity. Therefore, in cases like Flick, regardless of
whether the party filing the claim is employed at-will or under a
collective bargaining agreement, the employee activity will prob-
ably not be protected under City Disposal or Meyers and the
claim should not be preempted.
Even if a court determines that the factual situation in which
the claim was filed makes the filing concerted, the state action
will usually fall within the exceptions to the proposed preemp-
tion test. Filing a workers' compensation claim is a peripheral
concern of the NLRA. 1" 0 Also, the nature and gravamen of the
state claim for wrongful discharge arises from a state statutory
right, not the NLRA right to engage in concerted activity. Fur-
thermore, the right granted by the statute is not governed by the
NLRA. Therefore, wrongful discharge actions for filing workers'
compensation claims should generally not be preempted."'
C. Discharges for "Whistleblowing"
Some employees have been discharged not for refusing their
employer's request to violate state law, but for informing state
authorities that their employer was breaking the law. For exam-
ple, a milk truck driver was discharged for reporting to local
106. Flick v. General Host Corp., 573 F. Supp. 1086 (N.D. Il. 1983).
107. Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Kroger Co.,
583 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. W. Va. 1984).
108. Peabody Galion, 666 F.2d at 1316-19. The NLRB recently held that an em-
ployer's refusal to hire a former employee who filed a workers' compensation claim did
not constitute an unfair labor practice because the individual had not engaged in con-
certed activity protected under § 7 of the NLRA. WABCO Constr. & Mining Equip.
Group, 270 N.L.R.B. 887 (1984).
109. 573 F. Supp. 1086 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
110. Peabody Gallon, 666 F.2d at 1316-19.
111. In the rare case of an employee filing a workers' compensation claim to spur
other employees into engaging in other concerted activity, the employee's state action
should be preempted. This is because the nature and gravamen of the employee's action
are rooted in the NLRA.
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health authorities his employer's request that he deliver spoiled
milk to customers.112 In this case, the employer argued that the
employee whistleblowing constituted concerted activity, was pro-
tected, and that the NLRA should preempt the state action.
The initial question under the proposed preemption test is
whether the employee's whistleblowing constituted concerted ac-
tivity. Under either the City Disposal or Meyers test for con-
certedness, determination of whether the employee's
whistleblowing was concerted will depend in great part on
whether the employee blew the whistle to protect employee in-
terests or public interests.11 3 In general, if the employee blew the
whistle for the sole purpose of protecting state public interests,
he would not be acting to protect wages, hours, or conditions of
employment."' This means that his activity would not be argua-
bly protected under the NLRA and should not be preempted. If,
however, the whistleblower sought to protect employee interests,
then the employee activity would arguably be protected under
section 7. In these cases, the court should determine whether the
employee activity falls within the exceptions to the proposed
preemption test.
Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc.,"' the case in which the
employee reported to the local health authorities his employer's
request that he deliver spoiled milk to his customers, illustrates
the importance of determining whether the employee blew the
whistle to protect employee or public interests. In that case, if
Garibaldi, a unionized employee, blew the whistle to protect em-
ployee interests, his activity would meet the threshold test of
112. Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1372-74 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985).
113. Under Meyers, an at-will employee would also have to be acting on behalf of
others for the activity to be termed concerted.
114. The Associate General Counsel of the NLRB for the Division of Advice took this
view in Daniel International, 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1496 (1980). In that case, a unionized
employee of a general contractor constructing a nuclear power plant blew the whistle on
his employer's alleged construction safety violations. He appeared on radio and television
programs criticizing the employer's shoddy construction; he also filed numerous com-
plaints with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Missouri Public Service Com-
mission, the Office of the Governor of Missouri, and the Occupational Safety & Health
Administration. The Associate General Counsel indicated that he believed that the focus
of the employee's activity was toward the future safety of the general public who would
be exposed to the risk of radiation resulting from alleged construction defects. He deter-
mined that because the employee was only concerned with the safety of employees who
would work at the utility after its completion, the employee himself did not intend to
work at the plant after completion, and he was not concerned with the health and safety
of employees constructing the plant, his whistleblowing did not constitute concerted ac-
tivity. Id.
115. 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985).
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being concerted under City Disposal,16 regardless of whether he
also sought to protect public interests. The question would then
be whether his activity falls within one of the exceptions to the
proposed test. If the nature and gravamen of Garibaldi's act
were to protect his job or other employee interests, then his ac-
tivity would fall within the first category of preemption
cases-actions designed to protect employee wages, hours, or
working conditions. In most cases, this would mean that his
state claim should be preempted. Because Garibaldi also blew
the whistle to protect a state health and safety law, however, his
action could be viewed as deeply rooted in local feeling. This
would usually mean that his state action would not be pre-
empted. Employee desires to protect state health and safety
laws would be diminished if employees knew that their state
claims for wrongful discharge would be preempted. Thus, in bal-
ancing federal and state interests in this case, the public interest
in protecting citizen health and safety should probably dictate
that the NLRA not preempt the state action.' 1
7
Even if the public policy interests in health or safety were not
present, and the employee were acting to protect employee as
well as public interests, an at-will employee's wrongful discharge
action should probably not be preempted. For example, in
Harless v. First National Bank, a18 an at-will employee was dis-
charged from his employment at a bank after he informed a
member of the bank's board of directors that the bank was vio-
lating state and federal consumer credit laws. In this case, if the
employee was acting solely to protect public interests, then his
activity would not meet the threshold test of being concerted. If,
however, he were concerned with his own employment-for ex-
ample, that the bank might discharge him for alleged violations
of state consumer credit laws-then he might be acting con-
116. If he blew the whistle solely to protect the public interest, his activity would not
even be arguably protected under the NLRA. There would be no preemption problem.
See supra note 114.
117. If, however, Garibaldi had been discharged for informing the authorities that his
employer had violated a federal law, he probably would not even have a state claim for
wrongful discharge. This was the case in Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co.,
740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984). Olguin said he was discharged for reporting his employer's
violation of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1982). Olguin
brought a claim in state court for wrongful discharge. He alleged that he was discharged
in violation of the state's mine safety policies. Because the state in this case did not have
a mine safety policy, Olguin did not have a state claim for wrongful discharge. If, how-
ever, the state incorporated the federal law into its own policies, and an employee could
make out a claim for wrongful discharge, his case would be similar to Garibaldi's, and
probably should not be preempted.
118. 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1978).
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certedly as well as to protect the public interest. The question
then would be whether his activity fell within one of the excep-
tions in the proposed preemption test. In this case, the employee
activity is rooted in a state law that protects interests separate
from those protected by the NLRA. Even if the at-will employee
activity has the dual purpose of protecting the public interest
and protecting his interests as an employee, the gravamen of the
activity is based on the state law. That his activities also happen
to protect his interests as an employee is incidental to, rather
than the source of, his action. As such, the NLRA should not
preempt his state law claim. 119
CONCLUSION
The recognition of the tort of wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy has given rise to a potential overlap between
state actions for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
and the National Labor Relations Act. This overlap can occur
when an employee sues his employer for wrongful discharge
under state law, but the activity for which the employee believes
he was discharged is also covered by the NLRA. In these cases,
the state court must determine whether the NLRA preempts the
state action.
The traditional preemption tests are inapposite to the public
policy wrongful discharge action because the specific rationale
behind the arguably protected branch of Garmon and Morton-
Machinists do not apply to these cases. Nevertheless, because
the general rationale behind them does apply, courts must still
determine whether a particular wrongful discharge action would
infringe on the NLRA. In making this determination, courts, be-
cause the specific rationale do not apply in these cases, should
apply a flexible test that gives them freedom and guidance to
determine whether a particular state action would truly interfere
with the NLRA. The proposed test gives courts this flexibility. It
suggests that a court first determine whether the employee ac-
tivity is protected under the NLRA. If the court finds that the
activity is protected, the court should generally rule that the
NLRA preempts the state action unless it finds that the action
falls within one of the following exceptions to the rule: the state
action is deeply rooted in local interest, the employee activity
lies at the periphery of the NLRA, or the nature and gravamen
119. See supra note 105.
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of the employee's complaint are grounded in a state law that
guards governmental interests separate from the NLRA. If it
falls within one of the exceptions, the court should presume that
the NLRA does not preempt the state action. The court should
then weigh the federal and state interests in question to deter-
mine whether the state action would truly infringe on the
NLRA.
Application of the foregoing test to the most common types of
actions for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy indi-
cate that except in the case of an employee who engages in activ-
ity the underlying nature of which is governed by the NLRA, or
of an employee who sues under a state law that covers an area
occupied by the NLRA, the employee action should not be
preempted.
-Thomas Bean
